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INTRODUCTION
The cost in human lives and suffering is so high that we all have to work
to end violence and oppression once and for all. We have to proclaim that
every human being is equal, in dignity, in freedom—and, as the first
article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, we have to
live ‘in a spirit of brotherhood’.
~ Federico Mayor Zaragoza
He hath disgraced me. . .scorned my nation. . . and what’s his reason? I
am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs,
dimensions, senses, affections, passions; fed with the same food, hurt with
the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same
means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer as a Christian
is? If you prick us do we not bleed? If you tickle us do we not laugh? If
you poison us do we not die?
~ Shylock, Merchant of Venice, Act III, Scene I
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We live amongst great injustice. In this age, more than any other,
knowledge of the plight of those with whom we share this imperfect
world is accessible at the click of a button. Non-governmental
organizations strive to bring accurate, current reports of conflict,
poverty, and human rights abuse. And yet, for many, these
predicaments remain remote: a situation happening to others. The
comprehension that dignity belongs to us all is lacking. As Walt
Whitman said, “[A]s if it harm’d me, giving others the same chances
and rights as myself—as if it were not indispensable to my own
rights that others possess the same.”1
A typical snapshot of the problems of our global community is
provided by the monthly bulletin of the International Crisis Group,
which records potential and current conflicts around the world. In
January 2009, the conflict situation deteriorated in Israel/Occupied
Palestinian Territories, Madagascar, Mali, and Sri Lanka. The
situation remained unchanged in Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Basque Country, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia,
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chechnya,
Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kashmir,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia,
Macedonia, Mauritania, Myanmar/Burma, Nagorno-Karabakh,
Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Caucasus, North Korea,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria,
Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Western
Sahara, and Yemen. The only improved situations were in
Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zimbabwe.2

* BA/LLB (Hons) University of Auckland, New Zealand; Legal Associate at the
New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority. The opinions expressed are my
own, as are any errors or omissions.
1. WALT WHITMAN, THOUGHT (1871), reprinted in LEAVES OF GRASS:
AUTHORITATIVE TEXTS, PREFACES, WHITMAN ON HIS ART, CRITICISM 277 (Sculley
Bradley & Harold W. Blodgett eds., 1973).
2. See International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch N°66, 66 CRISISWATCH 1, 1
(2009), http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/crisiswatch/cw_2009/cw66
.pdf (summarizing and assessing developments in seventy locations across the
globe).
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This paints a grim picture, highlighting the continuing need for a
robust, respected international human rights framework. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)3 served as the
foundation of this framework and it continues to serve a fundamental
role in the protection of the dignity of human beings. Sixty years
have passed since its inception, but its relevance has yet to falter. The
UDHR has continued to evolve and inform the international
community’s understanding of human rights.
This article is centered on the UDHR, and like that document, has
dignity as its thread. It will briefly touch on the UDHR’s formation,
with a view to determining its contemporary influence as a living
instrument, and introduce the arguments made by certain
commentators against its status as a universal and modern document.
International refugee law and the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”)4 comprise the frame
through which the impact of the UDHR will be seen and analyzed.
This field of law is demonstrative of the ongoing norm-creating
ability of the UDHR. Under what is known as the “human rights
approach, international refugee law is shaped by the UDHR, as it
plays an indispensable role in determining whether an asylum-seeker
will be recognized as a refugee. New Zealand, Canada, and the
United Kingdom follow this human rights approach to determining
refugee status. The approach will be examined principally through
the jurisprudence of the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals
Authority insofar as it is representative of the common approach.

I. FORMATION: SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
The UDHR is a product of its time. The state of the world
following the Second World War and its utter disregard for the
sanctity of humankind demanded a document that would record “a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.”5
Article 28 of the UDHR best encapsulates this objective, a message

3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR].
4. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6260, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
5. UDHR, supra note 3, pmbl.
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which continues to resonate today: “Everyone is entitled to a social
and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Declaration can be fully realized.”6
Eleanor Roosevelt and her drafting committee intended the UDHR
to articulate an accepted standard of rights that would resonate
throughout the entire world.7 It was the first international instrument
to attempt such a task, and in that respect its value cannot be
understated. Roosevelt felt it was important to translate these rights
into words, believing the act of articulation to be educational.8 She
explained that “the conditions of our contemporary world require the
enumeration of certain protections which the individual must have if
he is to acquire a sense of security and dignity in his own person.”9
Despite challenges to the UDHR’s universal relevance and
enforceability (which will be elaborated upon below), it is commonly
perceived as the underpinning of international human rights and
credited as the inspiration of more than two hundred international
human rights instruments.10 Geoffrey Robertson QC has also
identified the influence of the UDHR on the bills of rights included
in nearly every national constitution adopted after World War II.11
Moreover, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”)12 and the International Covenant on Social, Economic
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)13 expanded on the UDHR and
translated most of its rights into legally binding form. These two
enforceable international covenants drew on the scope and content of
the UDHR.
6. Id. art. 28.
7. See Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Promise of Human Rights, 26
FOREIGN AFF. 470, 471, 475 (1948) (explaining the Human Rights Commission
recommended the authoring of a Bill of Human Rights in hopes that it would
contribute to peace among nations).
8. See id. at 477 (aspiring also to have the UDHR improve all peoples’
education).
9. Id.
10. See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE
FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 35 (3d ed. The New Press 2006) (1999) (noting the UDHR’s
remarkable “contemporaneity” decades after its creation).
11. Id.
12. International Convention and Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
13. International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
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The UDHR is held in such regard for its contribution to the
international human rights regime that the UDHR and human rights
have become almost synonymous concepts. As Jack Donnelly has
said, “For the purposes of international action, ‘human rights’ means
roughly ‘what is in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’”14
Despite such accolades, the UDHR faces criticism. The following
section will pose those arguments that question the UDHR’s
fulfillment of its objectives, its relevance, and its endurance.

A. TWO CORE CHALLENGES
1. Cultural Relativism
During the emergence of international human rights norms, a
debate over the universality of rights also arose.15 Cultural relativists
began to assert that the societal and cultural norms and values of a
nation prevail over an individual’s rights.16 These national or
communal traditions may affect the scope or application of any given
right.17
It is often argued that the UDHR is distinctively Western, and
therefore not universal.18 Relativists emphasize that classical
“Western” notions of human rights recognize the primacy of
individual, political, and civil rights, whereas most non-Western,
Third World traditions place greater significance on the community

14. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
22 (2d ed. 2003).
15. See Rhonda L. Callaway & Julie Harrelson-Stephens, Are Human Rights
Universal? in EXPLORING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSENTIAL READINGS
109, 109 (Rhonda L. Callaway & Julie Harrelson-Stephens eds., 2007)
(juxtaposing universalists, who believe that human beings are humans first and
members of a specific culture second, against cultural relativists).
16. See id. (referencing Asian, Islamic, and African cultures as the most
prominent locales of support for the primacy of local, societal values).
17. See id. (acknowledging that such traditions may modify or even reduce a
given right).
18. See DONNELLY, supra note 14, at 27 (explaining that Soviet bloc leaders
consistently rejected the legitimacy of civil and political rights, while Western
philosophers and the United States government denigrated economic and social
rights); see also id. at 22 & n.2 (calling the contention that UDHR values are
Western “problematic,” especially in light of the fact that significant contributors
in the drafting process were from Lebanon, China, Chile, and the USSR).
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basis of human rights, the duties attached to economic and social
rights, and the relative character of human rights.19
Bonny Ibhawoh, in an excellent and succinct analysis, put forward
three characteristics of Western civilizations which may lead to a
questioning of the universality of human rights.20 Cultural relativists’
argue that these and other such distinctly Western features mean that
certain so-called “universal” rights may not fit comfortably within
non-Western societies with different world-views and values.21 The
three characteristics common among Western communities are:
1. The individual is considered the fundamental unit of
society, as opposed to the idea of society as founded on a
familial or collective basis;
2. “[H]uman existence in society” is secured through the
language of rights rather than conceptualized as dutydriven;
3. The principal method used to secure rights is the
adversarial legal process, where rights are asserted and
adjudicated, rather than the realization of rights through
restorative methods such as reconciliation or education.22
Following on from these characteristics is the argument by some
advocates of cultural relativism against the hierarchy of rights—
essentially a challenge to the dominance of civil and political rights.23
Given that the overriding concern in many parts of the world is
access to basic social and economic rights, this is a vital issue to

19. See Bonny Ibhawoh, Defining Persecution and Protection: The Cultural
Relativism Debate and the Rights of Refugees, in PROBLEMS OF PROTÉCTION: THE
UNHCR, REFUGEES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61, 63, 67 (Niklaus Steiner et al. eds.,
2003) (noting that the dispute over the primacy of certain rights has carried over
even to the way refugee rights are defined and interpreted).
20. Id. at 63.
21. See id. (calling such Western values “ill suited” for non-Western societies).
22. See id. (observing several commentators’ attempts to temper the vigor of
cultural relativists by arguing that some rights are not suited for universality or
inalienability).
23. See id. at 66-67 (describing the debate over whether it is appropriate to
prioritize certain rights over others, or whether all rights should be accorded equal
weight and stating that several writers have recognized that civil and political
rights have taken precedence over social, economic, and cultural rights).
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proponents of cultural relativism.24 Therefore, a cultural relativist
will advance the argument that the UDHR reflects only Western
liberal values, especially in its bias towards civil and political
rights.25 In this regard it may be noted that only six of the twenty-five
paragraphs dealing with specific rights in the UDHR possess an
economic, social, or cultural character.26
The perceived dominance of Western attitudes is often attributed
to the drafting process. However, this is arguably refutable upon
closer examination. The committee that contributed to the final draft
of the UDHR consisted of a group of delegates of very diverse
origin.27 As Robertson notes, over half of the fifty-six-state General
Assembly members were Asian, African and Latin American.28 The
UDHR passed without a dissenting vote, although there were eight
abstentions: Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi
Arabia, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Union of South Africa, and
Yugoslavia.29 However, the communist abstaining States had no
issue with the substantive provisions on individual rights. Their
objection was a politically motivated response to the perceived
favoring of democracy in the UDHR.30
Although there is a quantitative imbalance in the UDHR between
civil and political rights on the one hand and economic and social
rights on the other, it does attempt to incorporate socio-economic
rights, including the right to work and to access an adequate standard

24. See id. at 67 (highlighting that civil and political rights are of little use to
those who are unable first to feed and clothe themselves).
25. See id. (pinpointing Western society’s orientation toward individualism as
explicative of its preference for civil and political rights).
26. UDHR, supra note 3, arts. 22-27.
27. See ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 37 (explaining that Chinese, Indian,
Lebanese, Chilean, Egyptian, and Iranian representatives played significant roles in
the drafting process).
28. Id. (“[F]ourteen members . . . were Asian, four were African and twenty
came from Latin America.”).
29. See RHONA K. M. SMITH, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
36 (3d ed. 2007) (positing that any significance accorded to these abstentions has
eroded with the passage of fifty years and the world’s increasing trust in the
UDHR).
30. See ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 37 (noting that the word “democracy” is
mentioned only once in the UDHR in an effort to mitigate the fears of the
communist abstainers).

ANDERSON_TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

122

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

2/5/2010 10:12 AM

[25:115

of living—aspects of which include health, housing, and education.31
Moreover, with the advent of viewpoints asserting the indivisibility
of human rights,32 one can regard the UDHR holistically. Its very
nature means that “the value of each right is significantly augmented
by the presence of many others,” rendering the tallying of rights
according to quantity in a particular category an empty exercise.33
In opposition to cultural relativism is a school of thought that
questions whether relativism retains plausibility in the face of
atrocity. The argument is that a cruel act is cruel to any human being
to whom it is done, and the UDHR, in trying to be universal, is
propagating the message that “every human being is sacred,” not just
those that are white or Christian, for example.34 Article 2 of the
UDHR makes the connection that the inviolability of a person does
not depend on his or her, “race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.”35
The following is an account of the recently reignited conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, where most parties to the
conflict have utilized sexual violence as a weapon.36 Human Rights
Watch recorded a mother describing the treatment of her twentyyear-old daughter:
They went after my daughter, and I knew they would rape
her. But she resisted and said she would rather die than have
relations with them. They cut off her left breast and put it in
her hand. They said, “Are you still resisting us?” She said she
would rather die than be with them. They cut off her genital
31. See id. (arguing that, for this reason, there is “little merit” to the idea that
the UDHR upholds only liberal Western values).
32. See, e.g., World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12,
1993) (“All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and
interrelated.”).
33. DONNELLY, supra note 14, at 27.
34. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 59
(1998) (explaining that any alternative conception of human rights would lead to
the conclusion that certain peoples are not sacred and not true humans).
35. UDHR, supra note 3, art. 2.
36. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE WAR WITHIN THE WAR: SEXUAL
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS IN EASTERN CONGO 23 (2002) (describing
the use of sexual violence as a means of gaining and preserving control over
people and the property that they owned or lived on).
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labia and showed them to her. She said, “Please kill me.”
They took a knife and put it to her neck and then made a long
vertical incision down her chest and split her body open. She
was crying but finally she died. She died with her breast in
her hand.37
If we were to choose other parts of the world, there would be
similar tales of horror. For example:
The torture techniques in Baghdad were routine and varied in
severity. The electric shocks could be everywhere. But
sometimes they would burn people on the genitals and go on
burning until they were completely burned off. They did the
same with toes. . . . I saw one man and they had used an iron
on his stomach. They used drills and made holes in bones,
arms and legs. . . . There was another torture where they
would put sulphuric acid in a tub. They would take a man and
start by dissolving his hands.38
These are just a couple of examples of shocking brutality that have
been and continue to be enacted in countless other places, times, and
situations. In places and times where such unspeakable acts occur,
does it matter that the UDHR has a strong focus on individual rights?
This author does not believe so. As Professor Rosalyn Higgins
eloquently explains:
Human rights are rights held simply by virtue of being a
human person. They are part and parcel of the integrity and
dignity of the human being. They are thus rights that cannot
be given or withdrawn at will by any domestic legal
system. . . . It is sometimes suggested that there can be no
fully universal concept of human rights, for it is necessary to
take into account the diverse cultures and political systems of
the world. In my view this is a point advanced mostly by
states, and by liberal scholars anxious not to impose the
Western view of things on others. It is rarely advanced by the
oppressed, who are only too anxious to benefit from
perceived universal standards. The non-universal, relativist
view of human rights is in fact a very state-centred view and
loses sight of the fact that human rights are human rights and
37. Id. at 55 (explaining that some “rapists react with extraordinary cruelty”
when their victims attempt resistance).
38. ROBERT FISK, THE GREAT WAR FOR CIVILISATION: THE CONQUEST OF THE
MIDDLE EAST 155-56 (2005).
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not dependent on the fact that states, or groupings of states,
may behave differently from each other so far as their
politics, economic policy, and culture are concerned. I
believe, profoundly, in the universality of the human spirit.
Individuals everywhere want the same essential things: to
have sufficient food and shelter; to be able to speak freely; to
practise their own religion or to abstain from religious belief;
to feel that their person is not threatened by the state; to know
that they will not be tortured, or detained without charge, and
that, if charged, they will have a fair trial. I believe there is
nothing in these aspirations that is dependent upon culture, or
religion, or stage of development. They are as keenly felt by
the African tribesman as by the European city-dweller, by the
inhabitant of a Latin American shanty-town as by the resident
of a Manhattan apartment.39
However, it is acknowledged that due to the hierarchical
classification of rights, and the lesser duties owed by states regarding
economic and social rights, an imbalance between the two categories
of rights remains. The UDHR’s enduring relevance may depend on
its ability to adapt to an increasing emphasis on socio-economic
rights, to ensure it remains in touch with how best to serve the cause
of human dignity. The subject of socio-economic rights is broached
in subsequent sections.
2. Enforceability
International law binds states only to the extent that they agree to
be bound. That states are often unwilling to recognize the authority
of international law has proven a key obstacle in attempts to expand
its scope.40 James Hathaway has identified the fear that “the gap
between declared universal law and the practice of states [is]
widen[ing].”41 This criticism of the UDHR is compounded by its
status as a U.N. General Assembly Resolution, with no legally
binding force.

39. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
HOW WE USE IT 96-97 (1994) (emphasis in original).
40. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-32 (2005) (hypothesizing that an expansive views of
international human rights dissuades states from acknowledging their legitimacy
because states will view those rights as mere rhetoric).
41. Id. at 31.

ANDERSON_TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

2009]

2/5/2010 10:12 AM

ON DIGNITY

125

However, as noted earlier, the two subsequent Covenants do have
this force. The UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR combine to form
the International Bill of Rights, which suffers less vulnerability to
challenges based on enforceability. As Hathaway goes on to state:
More than any other gauge, the International Bill of Rights is
essential to an understanding of the minimum duty owed by a
state to its nationals. Its place derives from the extraordinary
consensus achieved on the soundness of its standards, its
regular invocation by states, and its role as the progenitor for
the many more specific human rights accords.42
The next two sections attempt to use refugee law to evaluate the
strength of these criticisms and to test the contemporary normative
impact of the UDHR. Specifically, the following sections will ask
whether the UDHR has law-making abilities, whether it is
enforceable, and whether the imbalance between civil and political
rights and economic, social, and cultural rights is being addressed.

II. THE UDHR AND THE REFUGEE CONVENTION
International refugee law is a specialized field of law presenting its
own share of challenges. This article cannot traverse the breadth of
the law to provide comprehensive coverage of its issues, but does
attempt to convey fundamental principles of refugee law where they
intersect the UDHR.
There is a unique interrelationship between the UDHR (and the
entire International Bill of Rights) and the Refugee Convention.
Approximately eighty-six percent of the refugees in the world live in
states that have signed or ratified the ICESCR and ICCPR.43
Furthermore, the human rights agreements and the Refugee
Convention set overlapping guarantees. Therefore, as James

42. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 106-07 (Anne Lynas
Shah ed., 1991) (emphasis added) (asserting that having an International Bill of
Rights is “consistent” with the aims of the UDHR).
43. See HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 40, at 9 (comparing this number to the sixty-eight percent of refugees
living in a state party to the Refugee Convention or Protocol, and also observing
that, of those states party to the Refugee Convention or Protocol, ninety-eight
percent are party to at least one of the component instruments of the International
Bill of Rights).
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Hathaway recognizes, refugee rights will oftentimes entail a
combination of principles stemming from both refugee law and the
International Bill of Rights.44 Moreover, the dominant approach to
determining key aspects of the refugee definition is known as the
“human rights approach” and draws extensively on the UDHR.
A person will be recognized as a refugee if they meet the inclusion
clause of the Refugee Convention, Article 1A(2), being someone
who,
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.45
The “being persecuted” aspect of the definition is undefined in the
Refugee Convention. However, in a recent decision, the New
Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority (“RSAA”) discussed
three interpretative approaches that have been identified in various
jurisdictions.46 The first approach applies the domestic rules and
norms of the country of asylum in order to ascertain whether an
individual is being persecuted.47 However, the RSAA concluded that
this was “undesirable in the context of an international human rights
treaty which must be interpreted and applied according to
international, not domestic standards.”48 It would also too easily
allow “the intrusion of ideology and also the implication of censure
of the state of origin.”49 The second approach uses dictionary
definitions to aid interpretation.50 However, this has rightly been

44. See id. (noting that the convergence of refugee law and human rights
principles occurs in practice as well as in principle.).
45. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(A)(2).
46. Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, ¶¶ 37-42 (July 7, 2004) (N.Z. Refugee
Status App. Auth.), available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/REF_
20040707_74665.pdf.
47. Id. ¶ 38.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. ¶ 39.
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rejected as it exposes the problems that arise with the various
meanings of individual words, and fails to contextualize the meaning
given to a phrase.51 The third approach is the “human rights
approach,” and although not universally accepted, it is the dominant
approach.52
“Being persecuted” involves two key elements: a “risk of serious
harm and a failure of state protection.”53 An assessment of possible
breaches of human rights may inform either the existence of serious
harm or the existence of state protection. This is the “human rights
approach.” Hathaway thus described the human rights approach:
“refugee law ought to concern itself with actions which deny human
dignity in any key way, and . . . the sustained or systemic denial of
core human rights is the appropriate standard.”54 Moreover, in
another paper Hathaway wrote regarding the role of the judiciary, he
argues that relying on core norms of international human rights law
to define the serious harm aspect of being persecuted is both legally
compelling and pragmatic.55 He states:
[I]nternational human rights law provides refugee law judges
with an automatic means—within the framework of legal
positivism and continuing accountability—to contextualize
and update standards in order to take new problems into
account. Because international human rights law is constantly
being authoritatively interpreted through a combination of
general comments, decisions on individual petitions, and
declarations of UN plenary bodies, there is a wealth of
wisdom upon which refugee decision makers can draw to
keep the Convention refugee definition alive in changing
circumstances. This malleability or flexibility of international
human rights law makes it possible for you to address new

51. See id. (pointing out that because language is not precise, different judges
may understand the so-called “plain meaning” of a word differently).
52. See id. ¶ 41 (explaining that this approach is rooted in established rules of
treaty interpretation).
53. Id. ¶ 53 (emphasis in original).
54. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 108.
55. See James C. Hathaway, The Relationship Between Human Rights and
Refugee Law: What Refugee Law Judges Can Contribute, in THE REALITIES OF
REFUGEE DETERMINATION ON THE EVE OF A NEW MILLENNIUM: THE ROLE OF THE
JUDICIARY 80, 86 (Jordan, Nesbitt & Assocs. Ltd. ed., 1999) (believing the
International Bill of Rights to be a foundational, though not absolute, basis for
informing the evaluation of what constitutes persecution).
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threats to human dignity through refugee law, but to do so
without asserting either subjective or legally ungrounded
perceptions of “what’s right, and what’s wrong.”56
The courts in Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as the New
Zealand RSAA have accepted this approach. In Canada, the Supreme
Court recognized Hathaway’s description of the approach in Canada
v. Ward,57 with the United Kingdom House of Lords following suit in
Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.58
Refugee Appeal No. 74665 asked the immediate follow-up
question posed by the human rights approach, when the RSAA
stated: “Recognising that ‘being persecuted’ may be defined as the
sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative
of a failure of state protection, the question which arises is how one
identifies ‘basic human rights.’”59 The RSAA immediately
established that customary international law would be of little
assistance, given the notoriously difficult task of identifying
sufficient state practice and opinio juris.60 As such, the RSAA
confirmed that “treaty law provides a more solid and compelling
legal foundation.”61 The RSAA, many other national superior courts
and adjudicative bodies, and leading refugee academic Hathaway
overwhelmingly consider the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR to
be the treaty sources that provide the most solid authority.62

56. Id. at 85-86 (listing two other reasons justifying the reliance on the
International Bill of Rights, including first, the idea that because states determine
what international law is, it makes sense to enforce states’ own definition; and
second, the notion that by relying on internationally agreed-upon standards,
“refugee decision makers . . . are not combating the views of [individual]
governments”).
57. See Canada v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 733-34 (Can.) (citing
Hathaway’s words as a succinct explanation of how the underlying commitment to
human rights shapes refugee law).
58. See Horvath v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, (2001) 1 A.C. 489, 495
(H.L.) (U.K.) (invoking Hathaway’s ideas in attempting to define the limits of
“persecution” in the context of the Refugee Convention).
59. Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, ¶ 62 (July 7, 2004), available at
http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/REF_20040707_74665.pdf.
60. See id. ¶ 63 (expressing doubt over the usefulness of custom in ascertaining
fundamental human rights).
61. Id.
62. See id. ¶ 65 (emphasizing that the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR are meant
to be read together).
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In addition to its reputation, the rationale behind the UDHR’s
status as the first port of call is the ordinary principles of treaty
interpretation encapsulated by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (“VCLT”).63 Article 31(1) of the VCLT mandates that, “[a]
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”64
A treaty’s “context” as defined in Article 31(2) of the VCLT
includes the preamble.65 The preamble is expressly designated a
principal source of a treaty’s objects and purposes.66 The first two
paragraphs of the Refugee Convention’s preamble disclose the
human rights purpose of the treaty, and specifically refer to the
UDHR.67
As the RSAA recognized in Refugee Appeal No. 74665, the
preamble to the Refugee Convention is referred to in two important
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”)
documents.68 It can be found in the UNHCR Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status69 and in
UNHCR’s Interpreting Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to

63. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), opened for signature
May 23, 1969, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 92-12, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
64. Id.
65. See id. art. 31(2) (“The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a
treaty shall comprise . . . the text, including its preamble and annexes . . . .”).
66. See id.; see also Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in
Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176, 196 (Aug. 27) (using the Madrid
Convention’s preamble in determining that Convention’s objects and purposes);
Asylum (Colom. v. Peru) 1950 I.C.J. 266, 282 (Nov. 20) (using the Havana
Convention’s preamble in determining that Convention’s objects and purposes).
67. See Refugee Convention, supra note 4, pmbl. (“Considering that the
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
approved on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly have affirmed the
principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without
discrimination . . . .”).
68. See Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, ¶ 57 (July 7, 2004) (emphasizing that
both documents acknowledge the preamble’s significance).
69. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc.
HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (Jan. 1992) (noting that the granting of asylum is not
elaborated upon in the Refugee Convention, though it is referenced in the
preamble).
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the Status of Refugees.70 The RSAA notes that the second of these
two documents “accepts that human rights principles should inform
the interpretation of the refugee definition, as should the ongoing
development of international human rights law.”71
There are four types of rights within the International Bill of
Rights which form a hierarchy of rights for the purposes of
determining the presence of persecution in refugee law.72 These
rights clarify the extent of the obligation of protection which the state
will owe its citizen. First are those rights in the UDHR which are
non-derogable.73 Examples of such rights include freedom from
being “arbitrarily deprived of . . . life,”74 and protection from “torture
or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”75
Because of the importance of these rights, the failure to guarantee
them constitutes persecution.76 Second are the rights in the UDHR
and ICCPR from which states may derogate in a public emergency.77
Some examples are “freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention” and
“the protection of personal and family privacy.”78 Failure to
guarantee such rights will usually breach a state’s duty to protect,
except in case of emergency.79 Third are the economic, social, and
70. See UNHCR, Interpreting Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, ¶ 4 (Apr. 1, 2001), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3b20a3914.html (pointing out that the Refugee Convention’s preamble
utilizes language strongly supporting human rights ideals).
71. Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, ¶ 57 (July 7, 2004).
72. See HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 108
(implying that these four categories help determine which rights “are appropriately
considered to be basic and inalienable”).
73. See id. at 109 (commenting that these rights gained binding force upon
inclusion in the ICCPR).
74. ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 6.
75. Id. art. 7; see also HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note
42, at 109 (listing other such non-derogable rights found in the UDHR).
76. See HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 109
(stressing that even compelling national emergencies will not justify derogation
from these rights).
77. See ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 4(1) (specifying that such a public
emergency must be “officially proclaimed” and “threaten[] the life of the nation”
before derogation is permitted).
78. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 109 (internal
citations omitted); ICCPR, supra note 12, arts. 9-10, 17, 23.
79. See HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 110
(stipulating that the government’s actions also must be strictly necessary, not
inconsistent with other mandates of international law, and not discriminatorily
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cultural rights of the UDHR and the ICESCR, including, inter alia,
“the right to work, . . . entitlement to food, clothing, housing,
medical care, . . . and basic education.”80 At a certain point, depriving
an individual of particularly important socio-economic rights will be
the functional equivalent of depriving that individual of life or
subjecting that individual to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment.81 As a result, such deprivation of rights would be
considered persecution.82 Fourth in the hierarchy are certain rights in
the UDHR that were not carried over to the ICCPR or ICESCR,
meaning that they may fall beyond the ambit of the state’s obligation
to protect its citizens.83 This category contains “[t]he right to own
and be free from arbitrary deprivation of property.”84
The RSAA has applied the human rights approach to persecution
in different contexts including sexual orientation,85 and gender based
persecution.86 In Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93 Re GJ, the appellant
was a homosexual Iranian man.87 A principal issue was whether
sexual orientation could be the basis for finding persecution related
to membership of a particular social group (fear of persecution due to
group membership being one of the five reasons for refugee status
executed).
80. Id. at 110-11 (internal citations omitted); ICESCR, supra note 13, arts. 6,
11(1), 13-14.
81. See HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 111
(providing as examples of such key socio-economic rights, “the ability to earn a
living, or the entitlement to food, shelter, or health care. . .”).
82. Id.
83. See id. at 111 (concluding that, standing alone, violations of these rights
will not amount to persecution).
84. Id.; UDHR, supra note 3, art. 17.
85. See Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 61 (Aug. 30, 1995) (N.Z. Refugee
Status App. Auth.), available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/Ref_
19950830_1312.pdf (granting refugee status based on discrimination the appellant
faced as a homosexual man in Iran).
86. See, e.g., Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, ¶¶ 104-08 (Aug. 16, 2000) (N.Z.
Refugee
Status
App.
Auth.),
available
at
http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/
Ref_20000816_71427.pdf (elaborating that women are “fundamentally
disenfranchised and marginalised” by the Iranian government); Refugee Appeal
No. 2039/93, ¶ 144 (Feb. 12, 1996) (N.Z. Refugee App. Auth.), available at
http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/Ref_19960212_2039.pdf (holding that
an Iranian woman met the requirements for refugee status in part because of the
oppression she faced from her male relatives).
87. Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 4 (Aug. 30, 1995).
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according to the Inclusion Clause of the Refugee Convention).88 To
qualify as a “particular social group,” there must exist “an internal
defining characteristic shared by members of the particular social
group.”89 This occurs when “there is a shared defining characteristic
that is either innate or unchangeable, or if voluntary association is
involved, where that association is for reasons so fundamental to the
human dignity of members of the group that they should not be
forced to foresake the association.”90 The RSAA acknowledged the
application of the human rights approach in this interpretation of
“particular social group” when it stated:
In this way, recognition is given to the principle that refugee
law ought to concern itself with actions which deny human
dignity in any key way . . . . On this interpretation, the issue
of sexual orientation presents little difficulty. As we have
earlier remarked, sexual orientation is a characteristic which
is either innate or unchangeable or so fundamental to identity
or to human dignity that the individual should not be forced
to foresake or change the characteristic.91
Although neither the UDHR nor the ICCPR make any provision
for the freedom to choose sexual orientation, the anti-discrimination
provisions of these two agreements are sufficiently broad to embrace
this choice.92 Article 2 of each instrument articulates that all parties
are equal before the law and are entitled—without any
discrimination—to the equal protection of the law.93 As a result, “the
88. See id. (commenting that the Authority delayed handing down its decision
in the case in part because the appellant failed to provide adequate information
regarding the social group classification at issue); see also Refugee Convention,
supra note 4, art. 1(A)(2) (granting refugee status to those with a “well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons for race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion”).
89. Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 61 (Aug. 30, 1995).
90. Id.
91. Id. (citations omitted).
92. See, e.g., id. at 39 (explaining that the Tasmanian government
acknowledged sexual orientation is within the meaning of “other status” in Article
2(1) of the ICCPR).
93. See UDHR, supra note 3, art. 2 (“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without discrimination of any kind . . . .”);
ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 2(1) (“Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals . . . the rights recognized in
the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind . . . .”).
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law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”94
Refugee decision-makers have interpreted the anti-discrimination
provisions to include homosexuality, as it is acknowledged “that
[lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender] persons are entitled to all
human rights on an equal basis with others.”95 Moreover, as the
RSAA has accepted, the prohibition by law of private, consensual
homosexual acts violates the right to privacy articulated by Article
17 of the ICCPR.96 Therefore, in such cases, core human rights
would be violated.
Refugee Appeal No. 2039/9397 confronted gender-based
persecution where the appellant claimed that, as an Arab woman, she
suffered oppression within her family, and from society as a whole.98
The RSAA summarized her case as one that relied on the following
four grounds:
(a) Her race and religion.
(b) Her family background and the political activities of
family members.
(c) The oppression of female members of her family by male
family members.
(d) The oppression of women in Iranian society.99
The appellant’s principal claims were ordered according to the
hierarchy of rights in the ICCPR. She feared violation of the
following rights:
94. ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 26.
95. UNHCR, Protection Policy and Legal Advice Section, UNHCR Guidance
Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 6
(Nov. 21, 2008).
96. See id. at 10 (elaborating upon the notion that “[t]he very existence of such
laws,” even where those laws are only narrowly enforced and/or carry limited
penalties could greatly impede “LGBT persons’ enjoyment of their fundamental
human rights”).
97. Refugee Appeal No. 2039/93 (Feb. 12, 1996) (N.Z. Refugee Status App.
Auth.).
98. Id. ¶ 3.
99. See id. ¶¶ 3-4 (adding that the appellant argued alternatively that the
Authority should consider the cumulative effect of the claims to determine whether
her fear of persecution was well-founded).
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First Level Rights
Article 6: “The arbitrary deprivation of her life” by her male
relatives.
Article 7: “Torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment” at the hands of male family members.
Article 18: “The right to freedom of thought and conscience.”
Second Level Rights
Article 19: “The right to freedom of opinion and expression.”
Article 17: “Right to privacy.”
Article 23: “No marriage without free and full consent;
equality of rights.”100
The RSAA agreed that, “the concept of persecution is broad
enough to include governmental measures that compel [conduct] . . .
abhorrent to that individual’s deepest beliefs.”101 In assessing
whether a female claimant faces persecution, proper weight must be
given to the significance of her “being required to comply with codes
and requirements fundamentally at odds with [her] own conscience
and beliefs or deeply held convictions, or to engage in conduct that is
abhorrent to [her] own beliefs,” even where those beliefs are not
necessarily religious beliefs.102
In coming to this conclusion, the RSAA emphasized the ICCPR’s
Article 18 right to freedom of opinion and expression, stating:
This Article is directly relevant to the appellant’s deeply held
views of her right to function as an autonomous and
independent individual, to her passionate opposition, both to
the patriarchal society comprising her extended Arab family,
and to the male domination of women in Iranian society at
large. Additionally, . . . the right under ICCPR Article 18 of
spiritual and moral existence is closely associated with the
100. Id. ¶¶ 81-86.
101. Id. ¶ 97 (quoting Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993)). The
RSAA further noted that
[W]hen a person with religious views different from those espoused by a religious
regime is required to conform to, or is punished for failing to comply with, laws that
are fundamentally abhorrent to that person’s deeply held religious convictions, the
resulting anguish should be considered in determining whether the authorities have
engaged in persecutorial conduct.

Id.
102. Id. ¶ 99.
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right to privacy in ICCPR Article 17, as well as (private)
freedom of opinion in ICCPR Article 19(1). But the right to
freedom of thought and conscience under Article 18 means
the right to develop autonomously thoughts and a conscience
free from impermissible external influence. 103
In addition to the preceding cases involving civil and political
rights, refugee law and the UDHR can combine to vindicate the
social and economic elements of those universal rights that are
essential to human dignity.104 This connection to dignity is often
understated. Therefore, socio-economic rights may represent a
worthy channel for the law-making abilities of the UDHR. Judge de
Visscher of the International Court of Justice has classified
lawmaking treaties as “treaties the object of which is the laying down
of common rules of conduct (normes de conduite communes).”105
This avenue will be explored in the remainder of this article.

III. EVOLUTION IN TRAIN: SOCIO-ECONOMIC
RIGHTS IN REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATION
As indicated previously, social and economic rights rank third on
the hierarchy of rights, indicating serious harm and a lack of state
protection such as to engage the refugee protection regime. There are
significant qualifications attached to a finding of refugee status
related to breaches of this group of rights. Protection may only be
engaged where there is a discriminatory denial of available resources
or a failure to provide the most basic of necessities despite the state’s
fiscal ability to do so.106 This is because the ICCPR and the ICESCR
differ significantly in certain conceptual ways; the duty of the state
party under the ICESCR is not to “respect and ensure” the realization

103. Id. ¶ 81 (citation omitted).
104. See HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 111
(noting that the denial of fundamental socio-economic rights, such as the right to
food or shelter, can rise to the level of persecution).
105. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 40, at 72 n.218.
106. See HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 11011(highlighting that the ICESCR requires only that states “take steps to the
maximum of their available resources to progressively realize rights,” rather than a
pronouncing an absolute standard that states must meet).
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of rights, as is the standard demanded under the ICCPR.107 Rather,
the ICESCR requires only that a state party work actively and
earnestly toward recognition of the enumerated rights to the
maximum extent that available resources allow.108 As the RSAA has
explained, economic and social rights are limited in that “the scarcity
of resources which any human community has to reckon with”
qualifies the extent of the state’s duty to its citizens.109
However, the human rights approach to refugee law (made
possible through the reference to the UDHR in the Refugee
Convention’s Preamble) may enable the broadening of the scope of
applicability of socio-economic rights. As Michelle Foster has
articulated it:
Given that [the UDHR] sets out both civil and political rights,
and economic and social rights, and in light of the general
position in international law regarding the indivisibility of the
two sets of rights, this development [the human rights
approach] holds considerable potential for extending the
application of the Refugee Convention to claims based on
deprivations of economic and social rights.110
The traditional, conservative position has meant that successful
refugee claims were mainly limited to cases involving “economic
proscription,” that is, an almost complete denial of the ability to earn
a living.

107. See Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, ¶ 87 (July 7, 2004) (N.Z. Refugee
Status App. Auth.) (characterizing the rights guaranteed by the ICESCR as more
“context-dependent” than hose secured by the ICCPR).
108. Compare ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 2(1) (“Each State Party to the
present Covenant undertakes to take steps, . . . to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant . . . .”), with ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 2(1)
(“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant . . . .”).
109. Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, ¶ 87 (July 7, 2004) (citing CHRISTIAN
TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 39 (2003))
(acknowledging that, for this reason, the duties state parties owe to citizens can
never be stated absolutely).
110. MICHELLE FOSTER, INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC
RIGHTS: REFUGE FROM DEPRIVATION 16-17 (2007).
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Early RSAA jurisprudence displays this conservative position. In
Refugee Appeal No. 70863/98,111 an Iranian woman appellant was
directed by the Komiteh (revolutionary guards) to stop working as a
hairdresser.112 The RSAA identified Article 23 of the UDHR and
Article 6(1) of the ICESCR as the relevant rights and explained that
the two Articles “conceptualise work as being integral to the
attainment of a decent living.”113 The effect of this classification
meant that the RSAA had a relatively narrow view of exclusion from
employment.
That narrow view was that it is possible to establish persecution
only where individuals were “prevented from securing any
employment or where the only work which [can be attained] is, for
example[,] of an extremely dangerous nature or grossly out of
keeping with [an individual’s] qualifications and experience.”114 In
the instant case, the economic consequences on the whole were
deemed not to be “so detrimental as to amount to persecution,” as
there was “no blanket exclusion from pursuing alternative
employment.”115
The RSAA did recognize that, aside from being the means of
funding an acceptable standard of living, work “has a personal and
social dimension which is closely related to the realisation of self
worth and dignity.”116 The RSAA acknowledged that the appellant
had been forced out of the career she had chosen for herself.
However, as socio-economic rights are concerned with minimum
standards, it went on to explain that “[n]ot every breach of a
111. Refugee Appeal No. 70863/98 (Aug.13, 1998) (N.Z. Refugee Status App.
Auth.) available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/Ref_19980813_
70863.pdf.
112. See generally id. (denying refugee status to the appellant despite her claims
that she was forced to abandon her profession).
113. See id. at 8 (recognizing, additionally, that ICESCR Article 11 protects the
right to an “adequate standard of living”); see also UDHR, supra note 3, art. 23
(right to work); ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 6(1) (same).
114. Refugee Appeal No. 70863/98, at 8 (Aug.13, 1998) (citing HATHAWAY,
THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 42, at 133) (emphasis added).
115. Id. (concluding that the appellant had not worked in the beginning of her
marriage and therefore the income must not be essential to enjoying an acceptable
standard of living).
116. Id. at 9 (concluding that the appellant’s efforts in training and establishing
her own business reflected a level of personal enjoyment above and beyond the
simple satisfaction of receiving compensation).
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claimant’s human rights constitutes persecution.”117 The RSAA
believed that the appellant had not invested sufficient time in her
occupation such that “any proscription on following [her chosen]
profession [would be] particularly onerous.”118 Therefore, there was
no real chance of serious harm.
Michelle Foster has stated that until recently, “the jurisprudence
remained fairly undeveloped . . . particularly in respect of aspects of
economic and social rights other than the right to work.”119 She
believes that national and international adjudicative bodies are now
“displaying an increasing willingness to hold governments
responsible for practices that involve a breach of those rights.”120
These developments have led to socio-economic claims commonly
being successful where several less severe violations accrue in such a
way as to amount to persecution.121 In Refugee Appeal No.
71193/98,122 the RSAA granted refugee status to a Roma family from
the Czech Republic who had experienced severe discrimination in
employment, provision of health care and housing, and the education
of their children, and would face the same upon return.123 Again, the
RSAA acknowledged the dignity aspect of these types of claims.
Significant weight was given to the effect on the appellants of their
“long experience of involuntary abasement.”124

117. Id. (referencing Hathaway, who argues that persecution results only from
the denial of the “minimally accepted standards” of economic, social, and cultural
rights).
118. Id. (finding the fact that the appellant had worked in this profession for
only eighteen months and had trained for only three months particularly relevant).
119. FOSTER, supra note 110, at 91.
120. Id. at 18-19.
121. See id. at 104-05 (observing that this amalgamative tactic clouds the ability
to distinguish the violation of any single right, standing alone, as sufficient to
constitute persecution).
122. Refugee Appeal No. 71193/98 (Sept. 9, 1999) (N.Z. Refugee Status App.
Auth.) available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/Ref_19990909_
71193.pdf.
123. See id. at 14-15 (concluding that the cumulative effect of the discrimination
the appellant had experienced as a result of his race rose to the level of persecution,
and would continue were he and his family to return to the Czech Republic).
124. Id. at 14.
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An oft-criticized RSAA case125 concerned a Dalit couple from
India who also presented an account of past systemic
discrimination.126 The RSAA determined that they would likely
encounter employment-related difficulties and occasional
discrimination in accessing health care, and that they would return to
live in basic housing conditions. However, because India had “taken
steps to address the de jure and de facto discrimination against Dalits
and [was] taking steps to progressively realise their rights under the
ICESCR,” there was no failure of state protection.127 This was
despite the fact that the RSAA recognized that Dalits “remained
discriminated against in every aspect of their lives and remain the
victims of violence.”128 It was also acknowledged that between 1961
and 1991, the gap in the literacy rate between Dalits and non-Dalits
narrowed only slightly.129 Additionally, there had been “selective
installation in many villages of electricity, sanitation and safe
drinking water which bypass[ed] Dalit areas.”130
The RSAA emphasized other such small improvements in their
socio-economic condition. For example:
[W]hile the number of Dalits in poverty increased by 5 per
cent as a result of the economic policies of the government
between 1987 and 1993, this reversed a declining trend of the
previous 15 years. This 15 year reduction in Dalit poverty
suggests economic and social policies designed to benefit
Dalits were having some positive effect.131

125. See, e.g., FOSTER, supra note 110, at 108 n.87 (criticizing the RSAA for
evaluating the “wrong question” when it failed to focus on whether the state was
able to shield the parties from the fear of being persecuted).
126. See generally Refugee Appeal No. 75221 (Sept. 23, 2005) (N.Z. Refugee
Status App. Auth.), available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/Ref_
20050923_75221.pdf (holding that the appellants were not refugees within the
meaning of the Refugee Convention).
127. Id. ¶¶ 121, 141.
128. Id. ¶ 119.
129. Id. ¶ 120.
130. Id.
131. Id. ¶ 122 (recognizing that there is no indication that recent poverty
increases were the result of a state’s “deliberately retrogressive measures”).
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In contrast is another RSAA decision132 that appears to focus on
the correct question: whether the state’s ability to protect is such that
it eliminates the “well-founded fear of being persecuted.”133 The
appellants were a Roma family from Hungary. The RSAA
acknowledged various government reforms intended to improve the
situation of the Roma and combat the discrimination directed at
them,134 but recognized that instances of discrimination, as well as
negative stereotypes, remained prevalent in various dimensions of
the group’s social life.135 A report of the European Centre for
Minority Issues (“ECMI”) records the overall discrimination that the
Roma face:
One of the primary problems the Roma have to face is
prejudice. The Roma are generally considered by others to be
a dirty, lazy and stupid people who are prone to crime. That
they are often active in the black market and prostitution and
are disproportionately involved in recorded crimes
perpetuates the stereotype. However, the poor economic
status of the Roma, which is at least partially due to these
prejudices, is to a great extent responsible for this level of
engagement in crime. The Roma have all the characteristics
of an economic underclass. They tend to have high levels of
unemployment, sometimes reaching 80 to 90 per cent. They
usually live in poor housing, often dwelling in a ghetto-like
environment. They tend to be uneducated, having high levels
of illiteracy.136

132. See Refugee Appeal No. 75498-75501 (June 16, 2006) (N.Z. Refugee
Status App. Auth.), available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/Ref_
20060616_75498.pdf (rejecting four appellants’ claims that they had faced
sufficient discrimination to constitute persecution and warrant refugee status).
133. See FOSTER, supra note 110, at 108 n.87 (contending that Refugee Appeal
No. 75221, for example, incorrectly disregarded the question of state protection).
134. See Refugee Appeal No. 75498-75501, ¶¶ 108-09 (June 16, 2006) (citing a
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance report that indicates that the
Hungarian government made positive efforts at multiple levels of society, but that
problems remained in many areas).
135. See id. ¶ 140 (specifying the existence of police ill-treatment, unequal
justice, and socio-economic discrimination against the Roma).
136. Jonathan Fox, Patterns of Discrimination, Grievances and Political Activity
Among Europe’s Roma: A Cross-Sectional Analysis J. ETHNOPOLITICS &
MINORITY ISSUES EUROPE, Winter 2001/2002, at 3.
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Ultimately, the appellants’ claim was unsuccessful, as the
consequences of the discrimination, even considered cumulatively,
did not reach the level of seriousness required to constitute “being
persecuted.”137 This shows the high threshold that must be overcome
in social and economic cases, given the degradation that the Roma
face, as demonstrated by country information similar to the ECMI
report above. However, the methodology of the RSAA in this case
was sounder in principle than that of Refugee Appeal No. 75221,
which appeared to apply what Michelle Foster terms a “due
diligence” approach.138 This means that the court focuses on the
effort the state has expended, “rather than an ability to remove the
well founded fear altogether.”139 This latter case is also consistent
with the emerging trend noted by Michelle Foster, namely that states
are showing an increasing willingness to view critically state
attempts to fulfil core obligations, even in cases “where the state has
failed to provide a basic right (as opposed to having actively
withdrawn it).”140
Internationally speaking, recent claims have been founded on
discrimination in education and healthcare, which represents a
developing jurisprudence of considerable significance. Another area
where reform is desirable, and may be possible through the UDHR
and its accompanying human rights approach, must be mentioned as
a final act before concluding this article.
It may be recalled that within the hierarchy of rights there are
certain UDHR rights commonly held to fall outside the ambit of a
state’s duties, therefore not constituting a basis for the existence of
persecution.141 One such right is Article 17(2) of the UDHR, the right
137. See Refugee Appeal No. 75498-75501, ¶¶ 180 (June 16, 2006)
(recognizing, however, an expectation of some risk of discrimination and racism
upon return to Hungary).
138. FOSTER, supra note 110, at 108 n.87.
139. Id. (conceding that this may occasionally lead to courts denying refugee
claims on the basis that the state is “doing its best” to eradicate the discrimination).
140. Id. at 203 (underscoring that the court need not evaluate “whether the state
has ‘done enough’” in these instances) (emphasis added).
141. See Refugee Appeal No. 72558/01, ¶ 143 (Nov. 19, 2002) (N.Z. Refugee
Status App. Auth. ), available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/
Ref_20021119_72558.pdf (adopting Hathaway’s characterization of the right to
own private property as among those rights that are beyond a state’s duty to
protect).
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not to be arbitrarily deprived of property.142 Michelle Foster has
questioned the rigid application of the human rights hierarchy in this
context, as it may be inappropriate in the case of an applicant
dispossessed of his or her home, or facing such potential
dispossession.143 Such an individual is in fact being denied the
manifestation of an important right: the right to an adequate standard
of living.144

CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article has sought to elucidate the role of the UDHR in the
service of human dignity. To that end, the UDHR’s objectives were
explained and its formation critically examined. Subsequent sections
were arranged with a view to evaluate both praise and past criticism
of the UDHR. This was done through an examination of the UDHR
in a concrete sense, namely the way it plays out in an area of
practical application: refugee status determination.
Today, 60 years after the launch of the UDHR, it continues to have
a real impact in the protection of vulnerable asylum-seekers. The
rights enshrined in the UDHR operate as guiding principles for
refugee decision-makers in many states around the world every day
through their application of the human rights approach to
determining the existence of persecution.145
The UDHR will retain international legal relevance for many years
to come because it has the proven ability to continue to develop real
accessible rights. The amazing expansion of social, economic and
cultural rights in the last decade is a testament to this. Refugee
decision-makers, using the principles of the UDHR, have become
increasingly bold in holding states accountable to their obligations
under the UDHR and its companion agreements, the ICCPR and the
ICESCR. In this sense, the UDHR is a living instrument. The
UDHR’s ability to develop the realization of economic and social
142. UDHR, supra note 4, art. 17(2).
143. See FOSTER, supra note 110, at 147 (explaining that such a rigid approach
fails to take into consideration the specific circumstances faced by the applicant at
issue).
144. See id. at 147-48 (warning that this situation is especially detrimental to
women, who may continue to face discrimination in inheritance and ownership
laws, ultimately resulting in “severe economic deprivation”).
145. See Refugee Convention, supra note 4, pmbl. (invoking the UDHR).
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rights allows it to meet the priority of Third World societies: basic
economic and social needs. This also allows the UDHR to meet the
criticisms of those who advocate cultural relativism.
The UDHR has the potential to enhance its already significant
ability to create norms and thus shape the practical protection of the
world’s peoples. There is a category of rights within the UDHR that
is as yet unenforceable, but with the potential to protect those who
have been denied the ultimate dignity of shelter and the subsequent
ability to maintain an adequate standard of living. If basic rights such
as these can be accessed in a real and substantive way, such as to
avoid labels like ‘rhetoric’ or ‘aspirational,’ then there can be no
other result than the augmentation and the intensification of the sum
dignity of humankind.

